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Arguments from local knowledge are distinct from other arguments about
property’s justification. The standard justifications for property rights—those
that might be discussed in a first-year Property law course, for instance 1—
include: 1) Lockean arguments, according to which a party who labors on a
resource has a justified claim to it; 2 2) economic efficiency arguments based on
the role of property rights in avoiding a “tragedy of the commons,” 3 or
incentivizing parties to work and invest in resources; 4 3) autonomy-oriented
arguments based on the role of property in creating a sphere of freedom for the
individual; 5 4) arguments based on property’s potential to promote virtue and
human flourishing; 6 and 5) personhood arguments based on the idea that some
objects of property are constitutive of individual identity. 7 None of these
arguments relies, to any significant degree, on the special local knowledge
owners acquire regarding their resources. Indeed, discussions of the justification
for property almost always leave out the important idea that property owners are
often simply better informed about their resources than others and thus better
equipped to make decisions about them.
The role of property rights in channeling local knowledge is likely underappreciated, by first-year Property students and seasoned property scholars
alike, largely because property rights are so pervasive in contemporary Western
societies. We are simply not aware of the many instances that occur every day
in which an owner acts on local knowledge that would be difficult or impossible
for others to acquire and process. The homeowner who preemptively repairs an
old roof, the retailer who offers a new product for sale, and the farmer who
1. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES 174−280 (7th ed. 2017); BRUCE ZIFF ET AL., A PROPERTY LAW READER: CASES,
QUESTIONS, & COMMENTARY 29−38 (4th ed. 2016).
2. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18 (Richard H. Cox ed., 1982);
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 171−72 (1974).
3. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40−41 (8th ed. 2011); F.H. Knight,
Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECON. 582 (1924); Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
4. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360−66 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, What Happened to
Property?]; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *7−8; ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE 9−86 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Liberty Classics 1978); POSNER, supra note 3, at 40;
Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Property Rights and Economic Development, in 5
HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 4525, 4529−34 (Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig
eds., 2009) (formal model of the effect of insecure property rights in disincentivizing production).
5. Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 215 (2006); ARTHUR
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 86, 91 (2009).
6. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 748 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of
Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQS. LAW 127 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander, Ownership and
Obligations: The Human Flourishing Theory of Property, 43 H.K.L.J. 451 (2013).
7. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); G.W.F.
HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 73−83 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
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decides to switch crops are all decision-makers who are empowered through
property rights to act on local knowledge that no one else may have. In a society
of property owners, we have come to take for granted the vast body of local
knowledge that is mobilized by owners with the power to make decisions about
their resources. 8 Importantly, this body of knowledge cannot easily be acquired,
processed, and acted upon through centralized, hierarchical decision-making
apparatuses. 9 By decentralizing decision-making authority, property rights help
channel local knowledge into decisions about resources.
The knowledge function of property rights is perhaps easiest to see in cases
where property rights are removed and replaced by the comprehensive,
centralized governance of resources. For instance, the disastrous consequences
of the large-scale collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union and China
in the 20th century are now relatively well known. 10 Agricultural collectivization
failed in part because it centralized decision-making, depriving those with
knowledge of circumstances on the ground of the ability to act on their
knowledge. 11
These examples may seem somewhat distant and exotic to contemporary
North Americans. Yet North America has its own history of top-down land
administration by centralized bureaucracies acting without the benefit of local
knowledge. Beginning in the 19th century, “Indian Affairs” departments in both
the United States and Canada came to exert far-reaching control over day-to-day
life in Indigenous communities, including over land management. 12 These
8. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945)
[hereinafter Hayek, Use of Knowledge].
9. Id. at 524.
10. In both the Soviet Union and China, the collectivization of agriculture led to millions of
deaths, primarily from famine. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315,
1318 (1993) (citing ROBERT CONQUEST, THE HARVEST OF SORROW: SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION
AND THE TERROR-FAMINE 306 (1986)); ROBERT C. TUCKER, STALIN IN POWER 639 n. 68 (1990);
DMITRI VOLKOGONOV, STALIN: TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 524 (Harold Shukman ed. & trans.,
1991); Nicholas R. Lardy, The Chinese Economy Under Stress, 1958-1965, in 14 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF CHINA 360, 370 (Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank eds., 1987); Justin Yifu
Lin, Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 1959-1961, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1228, 1229
(1990).
11. FREDERIC L. PRYOR, THE RED AND THE GREEN: THE RISE AND FALL OF COLLECTIVIZED
AGRICULTURE IN MARXIST REGIMES 138, 147−48, 163−67 (1992) (outlining problems stemming
from organization size, including asymmetric information between workers and managers, as well
as the consequences of a lack of local autonomy, including lack of knowledge of local conditions);
JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE 210−18 (1998) (Scott explains how “high-modernist”
thinking led Soviet planners to implement schemes for large-scale farming operations with
centralized decision-making processes. The plans failed in large part because of the inability to
respond to local knowledge.) But see, e.g., Yifu Lin, supra note 10 (emphasizing the incentive
effect of a lack of exit rights on collective farms).
12. See generally Stephen Cornell, Remaking the Tools of Governance: Colonial Legacies,
Indigenous Solutions, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT 57−60 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007); TERRY L. ANDERSON, SOVEREIGN NATIONS
OR RESERVATIONS?: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 161−76 (1995); 1 COHEN’S
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centralized bureaucracies typically displaced pre-existing Indigenous
governance structures and property systems. 13 Decisions about resources that
had previously been made at the local level were subject to control, oversight,
and approval by a hierarchically structured bureaucracy headquartered in a
distant federal capital. 14 This centralization has tended to impair the ability of
institutions to take account of local knowledge. 15
To give one particularly egregious example, during the 1870’s, Canadian
government officials determined that wheat should be among the crops
cultivated on government-administered farms for First Nations in what is now
Alberta and Saskatchewan. 16 This was despite the fact that the strains of wheat
that existed at the time did not have a sufficiently short growing season for the
region, and despite a lack of grist mills in the area to process the wheat. 17 The
farms were mostly failures. 18 Even when wheat was successfully grown, it
sometimes could not be used. 19 There are, in fact, accounts of First Nations
people starving next to stacks of wheat, grown at the direction of federal
officials, which they could not grind into flour. 20 Of course, parties on the
ground were aware that wheat was not the best choice of crop under the
circumstances, but they were unable to effectively act on that knowledge. OnHANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §1.04 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2019); Fred S.
McChesney, Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and
Bureaucratic Budgets, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 297, 322−35; Malcolm Lavoie & Moira Lavoie, Land
Regime Choice in Close-Knit Communities: The Case of the First Nations Land Management Act,
54 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 559, 561 (2017); TOM FLANAGAN ET AL., BEYOND THE INDIAN ACT:
RESTORING ABORIGINAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 63−70 (2010); 1 REPORT OF THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 283−85 (1996) (Can.); 2 REPORT OF THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 485−519 (1996) (Can.).
13. For an overview of one traditional Indigenous property system, see Richard Overstall,
Encountering the Spirit in the Land: “Property” in a Kinship-Based Legal Order, in DESPOTIC
DOMINION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BRITISH SETTLER SOCIETIES 22 (John McLaren, A.R. Buck &
Nancy E. Wright, eds. 2005).
14. Lavoie & Lavoie, supra note 12, at 561, 567–68; 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW §1.04 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2019); FLANAGAN ET AL, BEYOND THE INDIAN
ACT, supra note 12, at 45–46.
15. See FLANAGAN ET AL, BEYOND THE INDIAN ACT, supra note 12, at 125–35; Jessica A.
Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Property, Sovereignty, and the Future, 115
MICH. L. REV. 487, 512–22 (2017) [hereinafter Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow]; Jessica A.
Shoemaker, Transforming Property: Reclaiming Indigenous Land Tenures, 107 CALIF. L. REV.
1531, 1542−53 (2019) [hereinafter Shoemaker, Transforming Property]; HARVARD PROJECT ON
AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS:
CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 5, 9−10, 113, 121, 125–29, 134
(2008).
16. SARAH CARTER, LOST HARVESTS: PRAIRIE INDIAN RESERVE FARMERS AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY 79, 91, 96, 99, 103 (1990).
17. Id. at 95−96.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 99.
20. Id.
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reserve farming operations of that era mostly failed, in large part because
Indigenous people were denied the opportunity to engage in the process of trial
and error based on local knowledge that characterized the later success of other
farmers in the region. 21 In comparison with off-reserve farmers, First Nations
farms were hampered by centralized control over seeds, farming implements,
and the location of farms, among other factors. 22
Centralized, bureaucratic control over land management has had dire
consequences for Indigenous people, as measured in economic and other
terms. 23 Indeed, in both the U.S. and Canada, federal control over local land
management continues to impede Indigenous economic development and selfdetermination to this day. Decisions about Indigenous land often cannot easily
be made by those who are physically present in the communities and aware of
local circumstances. 24 Special rules of land tenure in Indigenous communities,
including the federal trust status of Indigenous lands in the United States, are a
major source of ongoing bureaucratic control and oversight over decisionmaking. 25 These rules of land tenure go beyond restraining alienation, and often
impair ordinary decision-making about the use and management of the land. By
contrast, in most contexts outside of Indigenous communities, property rights
are the main institution that allows for decentralized control over resources by
parties who are likely to have relevant local knowledge.
In what follows, I will argue that channeling local knowledge is one of the
most basic things that property law does, in most contexts in which property
rights exist over physical resources. Indeed, this knowledge-channeling
21. Id. at 94. Beginning in the late 1880’s, other policies also came to impair First Nations’
agricultural operations, including a government policy of intentionally withholding farming
technology. Id. at 119, 164.
22. Id. at 95, 160−62.
23. See TOM FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 12 at 123−36; ANDERSON, supra note 12, at
111−34, 167−68; McChesney, supra note 12; Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow, supra note 15;
Dustin Frye & Dominic P. Parker, Paternalism Versus Sovereignty: The Long-Run Economic
Effects of the Indian Reorganization Act, in UNLOCKING THE WEALTH OF INDIAN NATIONS (Terry
L. Anderson, ed., 2016); Terry L. Anderson & Dean Lueck, Land Tenure and Agricultural
Productivity on Indian Reservations, 35 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1992); FISCAL REALITIES ECONOMISTS,
THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF MARKET REFORMS AND LAND TITLING FOR FIRST
NATIONS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2007), http://www.fiscalrealities.com/uploads/1/0/7/1/107166
04/economic__fiscal_impacts_of_fn_market_reforms__land_titling.pdf; Terry L. Anderson &
Dominic P. Parker, Economic Development Lessons from and for North American Indian
Economies, 53 AUSTL. J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON. 105, 119−22 (2009).
24. Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow, supra note 15, at 512−22; Shoemaker, Transforming
Property, supra note 15, 1542−53; HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF
SELF-DETERMINATION 5, 9−10, 113, 121, 125–29, 134 (2008).
25. Jessica A. Shoemaker, No Sticks in my Bundle: Rethinking the Indian Land Tenure
Problem, 63 KAN. L. REV. 383, 383−87 (2014). These special property regimes may be capable of
serving valuable functions, but in practice, they also often deny effective control over resources by
parties on the ground. See Malcolm Lavoie, Property Law and Collective Self-Government, 64
MCGILL L.J. 255 (2018) [hereinafter Lavoie, Collective Self-Government].
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function of property can provide a persuasive justification for property rights.
The local knowledge argument justifies property, rather than merely identifying
a collateral benefit of property, since it provides a compelling normative account
that fits the basic features of existing systems of property law. The local
knowledge argument can potentially appeal to those with a relatively diverse set
of normative commitments. Many objectives one might wish to achieve through
a property system depend to some degree on harnessing local knowledge.
A knowledge-based justification for property rights is in principle consistent
with a relatively wide range of institutional arrangements. Notably, it is
perfectly consistent with schemes that aim to redistribute wealth. Indeed, as I
will discuss below, undue ownership concentration tends to undermine the
knowledge function of property rights by centralizing resource decision-making
in the hands of a relatively small number of owners. An owner with many
physical resources under his or her control may be no better positioned than a
government bureaucracy to acquire and act upon local knowledge. If most
resources are owned by a narrow ownership class, there will be less physical
proximity between owners and resources, and fewer opportunities for owners to
acquire local knowledge relevant to their resources.
The idea that property rights channel local knowledge is not novel. 26
However, writers who have given detailed accounts of the argument in the past
have tended to emphasize the knowledge function of property in facilitating
interpersonal coordination, primarily through market mechanisms. According
to F.A. Hayek, property rights allow parties to act upon their own “knowledge
of the particular circumstances of time and place” in responding to price signals
that emerge from a multitude of transactions. 27 For instance, if the price of
wheat increases, and a farmer owns a field that she knows would be suitable for
growing wheat, the farmer can respond to the price signal by exploiting her
knowledge of the attributes of her field. At the same time, the price signal itself
26. See Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8; 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
LIBERTY 85−88, 106−10 (1982) [hereinafter HAYEK, LLL VOL 1]; F.A. Hayek, Socialist
Calculation: The Competitive ‘Solution’, 7 ECONOMICA 125, 141, 144 (1940); F.A. HAYEK, THE
FATAL CONCEIT, 29−37, 76−78 (W.W. Bartley, III ed. 1988); Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and
Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 16−17 (1964); Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B.
Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 573−74 (2008);
Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 965−66 (2009) (drawing an analogy between debates in
property theory and the socialist calculation debate over the viability of a centrally planned
economy) [hereinafter Smith, Mind the Gap]; Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1754, 1760−63 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property and Property Rules]
(Smith argues that property rules form part of an exclusion strategy that decentralizes decisionmaking. Depending on the nature of the resource, this can result in lower costs, including
information costs, as compared with liability rules, which require more centralized decisionmaking.); Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1331 (noting that because owners of small parcels are likely
to have better knowledge of their land than others, negotiations between neighbors over a matter
affecting both parcels will take place between well-informed parties).
27. Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8, at 521, 524−25.
AND
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functions as a kind of distillation of knowledge about local circumstances in
many different settings. The price of wheat may be going up because of weather
events on the other side of the world, for example. But the farmer does not need
to know anything about those events, other than what the price signal tells her,
namely, to grow more wheat if she can. According to Hayek, prices in a market
economy thus work to coordinate the actions of many different parties, each
acting on their own specific local knowledge. 28
The argument put forward in this article is both simpler and broader in its
application than previous arguments about local knowledge and market-based
coordination. Delegating decision-making powers to parties with local
knowledge is not just useful as a means of facilitating coordination in a market
economy. Property rights channel local knowledge into decisions about
resources in many contexts that are not linked to market-based transactions.
These include many of the decisions made by families about the resources they
control, such as the family home, as well as resource-based decisions made by
cultural, religious, and charitable groups. 29 Being able to rely upon local
knowledge to make decisions about a resource is important, regardless of
whether those decisions interact with a market. In other words, the knowledge
function of property rights is more fundamental, and generally applicable, than
the market-oriented role that Hayek and others emphasize. 30
The knowledge-channeling function of property depends on systemic features
of a property regime, including the decentralization of decision-making
authority. It is obviously not the case that every decision made by an owner is
informed by difficult-to-acquire local knowledge, nor is it true that every aspect
of property law doctrine privileges local knowledge. Yet as Henry Smith has
emphasized, when dealing with a complex system with emergent properties, like
28. Id. at 526.
29. On the use of property in land as a basis for collective self-government by cultural groups,
see Lavoie, Collective Self-Government, supra note 25.
30. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT, supra note 26, at 33−37. The knowledge-channeling
function of property in non-market contexts may be implicit in some of Hayek’s discussion of
customary norms and the development of the common law, though his focus is very much on
property’s role in facilitating coordination in a market economy. Hayek emphasizes how property
rights secure legitimate expectations, which in turn facilitates interpersonal coordination.
According to Hayek, rules based on exclusive rights to resources are general and predictable in
their application, which serves to facilitate individual planning based on legitimate expectations
about the conduct of other parties. For example, Party A, the owner of Blackacre, is able to predict
how Party B, a non-owner, will act in relation to Blackacre. The value of local knowledge in nonmarket-facing decision-making is arguably implicit in Hayek’s work, though to my knowledge it
is never something he notes explicitly. For instance, on pages 108−09 of HAYEK, LLL VOL 1,
supra note 26, he writes:
The maximal certainty of expectations which can be achieved in a society in which
individuals are allowed to use their knowledge of constantly changing circumstances for
their equally changing purposes is secured by rules which tell everyone which of these
circumstances must not be altered by others and which he himself must not alter.
See HAYEK, LLL VOL 1, supra note 26, at 85−88, 106−10.
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a property regime, it is an error to assume that the attributes of the system as a
whole will be reflected in each of the constituent parts. 31 The argument here is
that property as a system channels local knowledge into decisions about
resources, and that it may do so in a manner that is more effective than
alternative resource management approaches. In making this argument,
however, the article does attempt to link some of the basic content of property
law—including the agenda-setting authority of owners, principles of possession
and accession, and the law governing future interests—with these systemic
features of property. 32
The argument that follows is distinct from arguments that address the ways
that property systems manage their own internal complexity and associated
information costs. 33 Rather than seeking to explain how property systems
manage the legal complexity they give rise to, this article addresses the more
basic question of how property systems deal with the fact that effective decisionmaking about physical resources often requires access to local knowledge
specific to the time and place in which those resources are situated. While
property systems create legal complexity that must be managed, they also help
solve knowledge-based challenges due to the complexity of the physical world
and of human societies. These challenges could be intractable under alternative
resource management regimes. I argue that property as an institution helps to
address the challenges of decision-making about physical resources in a world
in which local knowledge can matter a great deal.
This article proceeds in three parts. In the first part, I explain what local
knowledge is, why it tends to be widely dispersed and difficult to acquire, and
why it presents a challenge for centralized decision-making structures. 34 In the
second part, I outline a justification for property rights based on local
knowledge. 35 I argue that by decentralizing decision-making about physical
resources, property rights channel local knowledge into decisions about those
resources. This in turn leads to better decisions and better outcomes than would
otherwise be possible, according to a range of possible criteria. In the third part,
I argue that the knowledge-channeling function of property helps explain
important features of existing common law property systems. 36 I argue that the
theory presented here reinforces a leading descriptive account of property,
31. Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 26, at 969−71.
32. In this sense, it may fit within a broader research agenda that links internal and external
approaches to private law. See Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Sizing Up Private Law, 70 U.
TORONTO L.J. 489 (2020).
33. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith,
Optimal Standardization]; Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1691 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Law of Things].
34. See infra Section I.
35. See infra Section II.
36. See infra Section III.
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according to which the essential characteristic of ownership is the owner’s
exclusive authority to set the agenda for the resource. 37 If owners are often best
positioned to acquire vital local knowledge about their resources, then it makes
sense that property rights delegate to those owners the exclusive authority to
make important decisions about them. In this section, I also argue that the local
knowledge function of property rights helps explain the role of possession, the
principle of accession, and rules that limit the control of past owners over
resources. 38
My focus in this article is on property rights in physical resources, including
land and tangible personal property, but not including intangible resources, such
as intellectual property. Knowledge linked to a physical context cannot have the
same significance for resources that do not have a physical presence. The fact
that local knowledge does not have the same significance for rights to nonphysical resources may have implications for how such rights ought to be
understood and under what circumstances they are justified. However, that issue
is beyond the scope of this article.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE
A. What Is Local Knowledge?
What is local knowledge, exactly? Broadly speaking, it can be understood as
any knowledge to which parties have privileged access by virtue of their
proximity to a physical place or thing, or their engaging in an activity involving
the place or thing. Local knowledge stands in contrast to other forms of
knowledge that are not as dependent on physical context. For instance, James
Scott, following Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, draws a distinction
between “abstract” knowledge and “metis,” meaning knowledge embedded in
local experience. 39 Hayek had previously drawn a quite similar distinction
between “scientific” knowledge, on the one hand, and “knowledge of the
particular circumstances of time and place,” on the other. 40 This distinction is a
key starting point for understanding local knowledge.
For Hayek, scientific knowledge refers to knowledge of the phenomena of the
physical world, and particularly those that can be accurately predicted according
to general physical rules. 41 Trained experts are often in a better position to
understand and apply scientific knowledge than parties who are close to a place,
37. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 278,
284, 289−90 (2008) [hereinafter Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity].
38. See infra Section III.B.1–2.
39. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 311 (citing MARCEL DETIENNE & JEAN-PIERRE VERNANT,
CUNNING INTELLIGENCE IN GREEK CULTURE AND SOCIETY (Janet Lloyd trans., Humanities Press
1978) (1974)).
40. Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8, at 521.
41. HAYEK, LLL VOL 1, supra note 26, at 15-16. See generally Hayek, Use of Knowledge,
supra note 8, at 521.
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thing, or activity. The physician who has reviewed test results is often better
able to predict the likely future course of an illness than the patient who is
experiencing it directly. The engineer with appropriate data before her is often
in a better position to know how to build a bridge, even in a location she has
never actually been to, than an untrained person who is intimately familiar with
the location of the proposed bridge or who has performed manual labor on
bridges in the past. With respect to scientific knowledge, proximity to a place
or thing, or involvement in an activity, is often not particularly crucial. But not
all knowledge is scientific knowledge.
The privileged epistemic position of the expert applies only in circumstances
in which general rules have predictive power. 42 This is often not the case in
complex, open systems with many interacting variables, nor is it the case where
relevant variables are either unknown or are contingent on circumstances that
are uncertain. 43 A great deal of useful knowledge is not “scientific” in character.
With respect to non-scientific knowledge, a distant expert is usually at a distinct
disadvantage as compared to a party with first-hand experience of a place, thing,
or activity. Hayek provides the following explanation:
We need to remember only how much we have to learn in any
occupation after we have completed our theoretical training, how big
a part of our working life we spend learning particular jobs, and how
valuable an asset in all walks of life is knowledge of people, of local
conditions, and special circumstances. To know of and put to use a
machine not fully employed, or somebody’s skill which could be
better utilized, or to be aware of a surplus stock which can be drawn
upon during an interruption of supplies, is socially quite as useful as
the knowledge of better alternative techniques. And the shipper who
earns his living from using otherwise empty or half-filled journeys of
tramp-steamers, or the estate agent whose whole knowledge is almost
exclusively one of temporary opportunities, or the arbitrageur who
gains from local differences of commodity prices, are all performing
eminently useful functions based on special knowledge of
circumstances of the fleeting moment not known to others. 44
Hayek’s focus is on how markets can bring about effective coordination of
the activities of different parties in an economy, each with their own distinct
local knowledge. 45 As a result, his examples emphasize knowledge of
circumstances that can inform market transactions, such as arbitrage
opportunities. 46 But the epistemic point is actually more general than that.
Dispersed knowledge linked to parties’ proximity to a place or thing, or
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

HAYEK, LLL VOL 1, supra note 26, at 15−16.
Id.
Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8, at 522.
Id. at 521, 525−26.
Id. at 525.
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involvement in an activity, is ubiquitous. 47 It includes potentially useful
knowledge that either does not have immediate relevance to a market transaction
or that a party may not be inclined to exploit for market purposes. However,
even if local knowledge does not inform a market transaction, a property owner
may still be able to use that knowledge to inform decision-making about the
resource. For instance, a family making decisions about how to use the space in
their home will draw on their knowledge of the physical attributes of the home
and the characteristics of the family members, even if these decisions are not
linked to markets. Similarly, cultural, religious, and charitable organizations
draw on the local knowledge of members in making decisions about the use of
resources in their communities, again without necessarily engaging with the
market.
A key feature of local knowledge is that it tends to be widely dispersed and
difficult for a central authority to aggregate, process, and act upon. 48 The
property owners in a city, for instance, have a dispersed body of knowledge
about the land and buildings they own, including, for example: What are the
potential uses for the building? Where does water tend to accumulate in the
yard? Which rooms are drafty? Will the furnace likely need to be replaced
soon? How do you access the attic? How is the furniture best arranged? How
are the bedrooms best allocated? What kinds of renovations are feasible? What
kinds of renovations might be worthwhile, either for current occupants or
prospective future occupants? What norms govern relations with the neighbors?
Similarly, farmers in a rural community are often best positioned to answer such
questions as: When should seeds be planted on a particular field in light of recent
weather conditions? What crops are suitable in a given year in light of the soil
conditions? What is the best order in which to harvest crops on different fields,
given the potential weather, the available labor force, and the state of the crops?
Decisions about residential home improvement provide a relatable example
that underscores the importance of dispersed local knowledge. Homeowners are
constantly formulating lists of possible home improvement projects. These
projects need to be prioritized, based on factors that include the skills of the
homeowner (i.e., what she can do herself), the homeowner’s available time and
inclination to devote that time to home improvement, the homeowner’s available
financial resources and inclination to devote those resources to home
improvement, the problems experienced by occupants of the home that would
be solved by a given home improvement project, the needs and preferences of
the current occupants of the home, and the potential needs and preferences of
future occupants of the home (which may affect the home’s resale value).
Seemingly prosaic decisions, like whether to replace the front window or instead

47. See generally SCOTT, supra note 11, at 309−41; HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT, supra note
26, at 77.
48. Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8, at 519, 524; SCOTT, supra note 11, at 6−8.
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enlarge a closet in a bedroom, can rely on local knowledge held by the occupants
of the home and no one else.
It would not be practically possible for a centralized authority to acquire all
the local knowledge currently held by owners. For one thing, the time and
expense might be too great. But even if a great deal of resources were
marshalled, the task would still likely be impossible. 49 Much of this local
knowledge is subject to constant change. 50 The physical properties of a resource
and the surrounding context are not static. A building might have previously
been optimally used as a warehouse, but it is now better off being turned into
lofts. The furnace might be showing signs of slowing down, necessitating a
costly repair in the near future. A new child might have been born to the family
occupying a house, making it desirable to add a bedroom. The recent weather
and soil conditions in a given field in the spring may caution against what would
normally be a suitable crop to sow. The constantly changing nature of relevant
local knowledge makes it difficult for all but those close to the resource to have
an up-to-date understanding of it. Incidentally, this is a fact that is generally
taken for granted in the insurance industry, which depends on owners’ legal
duties to disclose relevant information about insured property, and even then,
must account for the problem of adverse selection due to owners’ superior
knowledge of the risks facing their property. 51
Another problem for attempts to centralize decision-making is that some local
knowledge is tacit knowledge, meaning it cannot be effectively communicated
to a third party lacking the relevant context or experience. 52 A farmer may know
intuitively from experience that a tilling technique would be unsuitable for a
particular field, without necessarily being able to communicate why. Similarly,
a traditional hunter may have a sense of where game will be located in light of
the recent weather, without being able to articulate the reason in terms of cause
and effect. And a longtime homeowner, with a feel for the layout of a house and
the habits of those who live in it, may have a sense of how a kitchen should be
set up after a renovation. The cumulative body of tacit local knowledge about a
resource can be quite significant, putting centralized decision-makers at a further
disadvantage as compared with those on the ground.
It is important to emphasize that relevant local knowledge is not limited to
knowledge about the physical properties of resources. Locally held knowledge
about the people who are likely to interact with a resource can be just as
important to effective decision-making. This knowledge can similarly be
difficult, or in some cases, impossible, for centralized decision-makers to
49. Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8, at 519, 521−24.
50. Id. at 522−24.
51. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, 90
Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976); Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance
Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39 (2010); Francis Achampong, Uberrima Fides in English and
American Insurance Law: A Comparative Analysis, 36 INT’L COMPAR. L.Q. 329, 338 (1987).
52. See MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4−5, 8, 20 (1966).
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acquire and act upon. The needs and preferences of those who are likely to use
the resource are one example. A business owner familiar with a neighborhood
may be aware of the unmet demand of potential customers in that neighborhood,
just as a homeowner may be aware of changes to the home that would suit the
preferences of those currently living in the home or who are likely to live there
in the future. Knowledge about local norms can also be important to resourcebased decision-making. For instance, certain kinds of activities may be likely to
give rise to conflicts with neighbors, which can be costly. Parties who are
embedded in a local community are in a much better position to account for such
local norms in their decisions. Knowledge about local needs, preferences, and
norms differs from knowledge about physical properties of resources in many
ways. Yet these forms of knowledge often share the key attributes of being
highly dispersed within society and difficult for centralized authorities to
account for in making decisions.
An exhaustive categorization of forms of local knowledge may not be
possible. However, one can identify a number of different categories: 1)
knowledge about the physical characteristics of the resource; 2) knowledge
about local conditions relevant to the use of the resource; 3) knowledge about
the needs and preferences of those who are likely to use the resource; 4)
knowledge about complementary resources that can be used in connection with
the physical resource; 5) knowledge about activities or processes that enhance
the use of the resource; and 6) knowledge about local norms relevant to the use
of the resource in human society. With respect to each of these categories, it
will often be the case that a party close to the resource or involved in activities
related to the resource will be in a privileged epistemic position relative to
outsiders, even outside experts. The specific relevance of this insight to
justifying and understanding property rights is explored in greater detail below.
B. Local Knowledge and Organizations
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to acknowledge the role of
organizations in decision-making about resources. Many resources are managed
by organizations consisting of multiple individuals with their own internal
decision-making processes. Examples include business firms, charities, and
families. Decisions about resources owned by an organization are not
necessarily made by the members of the organization with the most immediate
local knowledge about the resource. For instance, employees of a business
might have greater local knowledge about a building than the CEO who ends up
making a final decision about it. Acquiring, processing, and acting upon local
knowledge is a major challenge for organizations, a challenge that typically
becomes greater with the size and complexity of the organization. 53 However,
the local knowledge advantages of decentralized decision-making can
53. ARNOLD PICOT ET AL., INFORMATION, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 24, 27
(2008).
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sometimes be outweighed by other benefits associated with having a larger
organization. These include reducing transaction costs and taking advantage of
economies of scale. 54 Organizations may also be better at acting on what Hayek
called “scientific” knowledge produced by experts. 55 To the extent that such
knowledge is important to the activity in question—such as, for instance,
building a nuclear reactor—a more centralized organizational structure may be
favored.
It is possible for well-structured organizations to adopt internal processes to
encourage the communication of relevant local knowledge to those making
decisions. This will be easiest to achieve in cases where decision-makers share
the same context and background information as those with local knowledge. 56
That said, it will typically not be possible for centralized decision-makers within
an organization to take account of all local knowledge that is available to those
on the ground. 57
The local-knowledge costs of centralization may differ across activities.
Some activities, such as farming, may rely particularly heavily on local
knowledge, and so may be resistant to centralized administration, while for other
activities, such as operating a general retail business, the costs may be more
modest relative to the benefits of a larger organization. 58 In each case, however,
the benefits of centralization must be weighed against the costs, which include
a reduced capacity to channel local knowledge into decision-making. These
costs and benefits can change over time. For instance, it may be that the optimal
scale of certain kinds of farming operations is increasing due to changes in
technology and the labor market. 59 Yet the ability to channel local knowledge
of physical conditions into decisions remains an important factor in the success
of agricultural operations, and one that tends to limit their scale. 60 Firm
ownership in primary agricultural production remains highly decentralized

54. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING
96−98 (1985); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1119 (1990).
55. Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8, at 521.
56. See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1105, 1125−33 (2003).
57. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 6−7, 316.
58. Id. at 313.
59. KLAUS DEININGER & DEREK BYERLEE, RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND: CAN
IT YIELD SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS? 30−31 (2011). Average farm size has
increased in the US since 2007, as has the number of very large farms of 2,000 acres or more.
However, most US farms are still under 180 acres in size. U. S. DEP’T OF AGRI., 2017 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE: UNITED STATES SUMMARY AND STATE DATA 7 (2019) [hereinafter 2017 CENSUS
OF AGRICULTURE].
60. DEININGER & BYERLEE, supra note 59, at 28−30; SCOTT, supra note 11, at 318.
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compared with most other industries, in part due to the importance of local
knowledge. 61
All of this is simply to say that while local knowledge is important, it is not
the only thing that matters in decision-making about resources. While local
knowledge tends to favor decentralized decision-making, including through the
mechanism of property rights, it does not necessarily follow that decisionmaking should be decentralized to the greatest extent possible. There is an
important role for hierarchically structured organizations, even if their ability to
process and act upon relevant local knowledge tends to diminish with the size of
the organization. However, while decentralizing decision-making to take
advantage of local knowledge involves tradeoffs with other variables,
approaches that centralize control over all of a society’s resources within a single
organization appear highly prone to decision failures. 62
C. Local Knowledge and “Big Data”
It has recently been suggested that the advent of powerful computers, large
data sets, and advanced techniques for interpreting data has diminished the
importance of local knowledge, expanding the realm of technical and expertisedriven forms of decision-making. 63 In at least some areas, the significance of
local knowledge has clearly been diminished by expert data analysis. For
instance, drivers’ knowledge about the best routes to take on local roads has been
largely, if not entirely, rendered irrelevant by navigation software on
smartphones that analyzes immense troves of data relating to travel time. 64
Another area in which data analysis has displaced local knowledge, to at least
some degree, is in retailing. Crafting a retail environment has always been a
subtle activity that draws upon the practical knowledge and experience of those
working in the business. 65 However, increasingly sophisticated, data-based
“scientific” knowledge on questions like how best to lay out a store or what
products to stock has led to reduced reliance on local knowledge. 66 Whereas in
the past those working in retail businesses might have relied on their intuitions
61. DEININGER & BYERLEE, supra note 59, at 28−30. More than 97% of U.S. farms are
owned by an individual, a family, a partnership, or a family-held corporation. These farms
represent 92% of the land devoted to farming. See 2017 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 59,
at 170−71.
62. See Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1318; SCOTT, supra note 11, at 6; PRYOR, supra note 11,
at 138, 147−48, 163−67.
63. See Richard A. Epstein, The Uses and Limits of Local Knowledge: A Cautionary Note on
Hayek, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 205, 206−07 (2005).
64. Dan Fumano, ‘Rat-Running’ and ‘the Price of Anarchy.’ Vancouver Copes with GPSEnabled Cars, VANCOUVER SUN, Feb. 12, 2020, https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/danfumano-rat-running-and-the-price-of-anarchy-vancouver-copes-with-gps-enabled-cars.
65. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v.
Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 49 (1997) (discussing the practical knowledge necessary to structure
a retail environment).
66. Id.
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or past experiences in predicting demand for a given product at a given price,
today such businesses are much more likely to rely on statistical analysis of
consumer data. 67 However, it would be premature to suggest that decentralizing
control of resources to take advantage of local knowledge is no longer necessary,
and that centralized control of resources by large, data-driven organizations is
the way of the future.
Even for decisions where good data is available, data analysis may not be able
to fully replace decision-making by those with relevant local knowledge. For
one thing, data analysis is always based on information about past events, but
circumstances are always changing. When a change in circumstances occurs for
which no past precedent exists, data analysis will necessarily have limited
predictive power. When a completely new product is introduced, for instance,
demand for that product may be genuinely uncertain, in the sense of not being
calculable based on existing information. 68 In these cases, dispersed knowledge
may be important in guiding decision-making, and this may include a business
owner’s understanding of how the new product will potentially fit with the dayto-day lifestyles of his customers. Similarly, in agriculture, climate change may
mean that past data on weather and soil conditions has less predictive power and
that more reliance must be placed on the lived experience of farmers who have
seen the effects of those changes first-hand.
When relevant formal data is not available, local knowledge continues to be
important to the many decisions an owner must make. These include decisions
that depend on factors that are too specific to a particular context to be properly
informed by data derived from other settings. For instance, “big data” on its
own is seldom going to be determinative in many decisions faced by
homeowners, such as whether it makes more sense to renovate the kitchen or
add a bedroom. Unless the owner plans to immediately put the house on the
market, the factors informing a decision like that are likely specific to the home
and its residents.
Similarly, data on climate and soil may help to indicate that a particular crop
could be suitable to a particular location, but there are a multitude of non-databased reasons why a farmer with local knowledge might decide not to grow the
crop. For instance, the farmer might decline to grow the crop based on his
knowledge of the skill set of the local farm labor force. James Scott identifies
other factors that scientific agriculture has struggled to account for, including
the needs of family and community, “long-term soil structure, ecological
diversity, and sustainability.” 69 In each of these areas, the knowledge of those
67. See Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, When Data Creates Competitive Advantage, HARV.
BUS. REV., Jan.−Feb. 2020, https://hbr.org/2020/01/when-data-creates-competitive-advantage.
68. An analogy can be drawn to the distinction between risk, which is calculable, and
uncertainty, which is not. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (9th ed., 2014)
(citing FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A
TREATISE ON PROBABILITY (1921)).
69. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 322.
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with local experience may be vital to effective decision-making, and may help
explain the remarkable persistence of owner-operated family farms. 70 While
“big data” has expanded the domain of technical decision-making, the realm of
local knowledge is still quite extensive.
II. LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. How Property Channels Local Knowledge
The essence of the local knowledge argument is that property rights devolve
decision-making authority to parties who either have local knowledge or who
are well-positioned to acquire it. In other words, property rights tend to unite
both decision-making authority over a resource and local knowledge about that
resource in the same person. It is reasonably clear that property rights confer a
range of decision-making powers on owners. 71 The other half of the equation,
though, requires some explanation. There are several features of property rights
that lead owners to occupy a privileged position in terms of the local knowledge
they have about a resource.
First of all, existing property owners tend to have the opportunity to acquire
local knowledge. 72 Since an owner typically has rights to access and use a
resource, she has the opportunity both to achieve physical proximity to the
resource and to engage in activities with the resource. 73 Physical proximity and
engaging in activities with a resource are two key mechanisms for acquiring
local knowledge. A person who spends time on a parcel of land, for instance, is
likely to acquire information about local conditions and the physical
characteristics of the land. The same person is even more likely to acquire such
information if he is actively using the resource in some way. And so, the special
opportunities an owner has to use and occupy a resource help to explain the
owner’s acquisition of local knowledge.
But perhaps just as significant as the opportunities owners have to acquire
local knowledge are the incentives that lead them to acquire such knowledge.
These incentives stem from property owners’ right to derive benefits from the
property, including benefits of use, income derived from the property, and
increases in value. Owners may attempt to directly acquire local knowledge
about the resource, so as to be better able to derive benefits from it. However,
owners also have incentives to use the resource in ways that lead indirectly to
the acquisition of local knowledge. For instance, in the course of running a
70. DEININGER & BYERLEE, supra note 59, at 28-30; SCOTT, supra note 11, at 318.
71. For a leading account of the “incidents” of property ownership, see Tony Honoré,
Ownership, in MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161 (1987). For an
overview of competing accounts of the concept of property, see Thomas W. Merrill, Property and
the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730−39 (1998) [hereinafter Merrill, Right to Exclude].
72. Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 71, at 730–39.
73. Id.
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business in a building, a business owner may incidentally learn of ways the
building could be more effectively laid out.
The incentive dimension of local knowledge acquisition means that even
where an owner does not have relevant local knowledge about the resource at
the outset of her tenure as owner, she is likely to acquire it. Someone who
recently bought a resource, or who received it as a gift, may not currently have
relevant local knowledge, but such a party is immediately subject to incentives
to try to learn about the resource and to engage in activities that may lead
incidentally to the acquisition of knowledge.
The range of decisions that a property owner can make about resources that
are informed by local knowledge is quite extensive. They include decisions
about whether to use the resource, and if so, how. A farmer’s decision about
whether to let a field lie fallow, or to grow wheat or barley, would fit this
description. Another example would be a decision about whether to give access
or control to some other party for a temporary period, and if so, to whom. For
instance, the owner of a business may entrust a delivery truck to an employee,
or the owner of a building may choose a tenant. In the case of freely transferable
resources, relevant decisions might also include a decision about whether to sell
or give the resource away, and if so, to whom. Local knowledge could inform
the timing of the sale and the identity of the recipient, among other factors.
Importantly, the kinds of decisions that can be informed by local knowledge
include both market-facing decisions and non-market-facing decisions. An
owner may choose to use a resource to produce something for sale or choose to
sell the resource itself. However, an owner can also draw on local knowledge
in ways that improve decision-making without involving the market. Such
decisions would include a choice to use the resource for the benefit of the owner,
the owner’s family and friends, or the wider community. The allocation of space
within a family home, or the dedication of a building for use as a community
hall are examples. 74 Gratuitous transfers of resources, for instance to family
members or charities, either inter vivos or through a will, can also be informed
by knowledge of the resource or the recipient. These non-market-facing
decisions involve significant amounts of resources, even within modern market
economies. 75 And so, while arguments based on the role of property in
channeling local knowledge have historically been linked to defenses of the
market, such arguments are in fact not contingent on markets. Indeed, local
knowledge can be particularly significant with respect to managing resources
74. See Caroline (Village) v. Roper, 37 D.L.R. 4th 761 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (providing example
of land transfer for a community hall).
75. For estimates of average annual charitable contributions in Canada and the United States,
see Charles Lamman et al., Generosity in Canada and the United States: The 2016 Generosity
Index, FRASER RSCH. BULL., Dec. 2016. For an estimate of the scale of intergenerational wealth
transfer in one major metropolitan region, see JOHN J. HAVENS & PAUL G. SCHERVISH, WEALTH
TRANSFER ESTIMATES: 2001 TO 2055 - WASHINGTON D.C. METROPOLITAN AREA, (Ctr. on Wealth
and Philanthropy, Bos. Coll. ed., 2006).
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that are inalienable and thus kept out of the market, such as lands held by
Indigenous communities. 76
The argument that property rights channel local knowledge into decisions
about resources is subject to two important qualifications. Firstly, the argument
describes a systemic feature of property systems, not a hard-and-fast rule about
the ownership of every resource. It is obviously not the case that property
owners always have more local knowledge about a resource than anyone else.
The recent buyer of a home knows much less about it than the seller who grew
up in the home, for example. The absentee business owner knows less about the
building in which a business operates than a dedicated long-time employee.
However, even in cases like these, property rights do provide mechanisms to
address owners’ knowledge gaps. In the first example, the new homeowner is
going to have opportunities and incentives to acquire knowledge over time,
especially if she lives in the home. In the second example, the absentee business
owner may face financial incentives either to become better informed and
acquire the knowledge relevant to running the business, or else to sell the
business to someone who will do so. A prospective new owner willing to acquire
local knowledge would presumably be able to operate the business more
profitably than the absentee owner. Accordingly, the prospective owner would
be willing to pay more for it than the present value placed on it by the absentee
owner.
However, even if the property system does not effectively confer ownership
on the most knowledgeable parties all the time, it may still serve a knowledge
function at a systemic level. Property systems display systemic complexity, in
the sense that the emergent properties of the system as a whole are not readily
reducible to the properties of the constituent parts. 77 One consequence of
complexity is that it is not necessarily appropriate to assume that the properties
of the system as a whole will always be reflected in the properties of the
constituent parts, and vice versa. 78 Water is composed of water molecules but
“wetness” is an emergent property of water that is not present at the level of
individual water molecules. 79 Similarly, characteristics that one might desire in
a property system might be present at the level of the system as a whole, even if
they are not always identifiable in particular rules, decisions, or transactions
within the system. 80 Channeling local knowledge into decisions about resources
is a product of the systemic features of a property rights regime, including in
particular, its distribution of decision-making authority. Property rights
decentralize decision-making in a way that makes it more likely that any given
decision-maker will have relevant local knowledge. But property rights do not
76. See Lavoie, Collective Self-Government, supra note 25; Malcolm Lavoie, Why Restrain
Alienation of Indigenous Lands?, 49 U.B.C. L. REV. 997 (2016).
77. Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 26, at 969–71.
78. Id. at 970.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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guarantee that in every particular instance the party making a decision will have
the best access to local knowledge.
The second qualification is that local knowledge is not the only factor relevant
to a functioning property system. Other important considerations include costs
of administration, costs associated with risk and uncertainty, and transaction
costs. It would not make sense, for instance, to make ownership legally
contingent on the owner’s having local knowledge about the resource. A
property regime that constantly reallocated rights to parties who could show that
they had the best local knowledge about a given resource would be
dysfunctional. Such a hypothetical regime would be costly to administer, would
create uncertainty for property owners, and would impede mutually beneficial
transactions. To say that property systems are justified in part by the function
they serve in channeling local knowledge into decisions about resources is not
to say that this is the only factor relevant to the structure of a property system.
Local knowledge is important and helps explain and justify the broad contours
of property law, but it is not everything.
Similarly, while it is possible to decentralize decision-making without
property rights, the costs associated with alternative decentralization strategies
mean they are unpromising as full-scale alternatives, rather than complements,
to property. For instance, decentralization can be achieved through the
delegation of decision-making authority within a large organization. This can
make sense as a resource management strategy in some cases, due to economies
of scale or the ability of a larger organization to minimize transaction costs.
However, attempting to manage all of a society’s resources through the
delegation of control powers from a centralized authority would involve costs
that could be prohibitive, at least if those control powers were not linked to other
traditional incidents of property. A party with delegated control powers, but not
the right to derive benefits from a resource, for instance, would have limited
incentives to use the resource effectively. By delegating not just the power to
control resources, but also other associated incidents, property systems allow for
decentralization while limiting the costs associated with doing so, including the
incentive costs associated with dividing control from other traditional incidents
of property.
Even subject to these important qualifications, channeling local knowledge
provides a compelling justification for property rights. The argument constitutes
a justification for property, rather than a mere description of collateral benefits
associated with property, since it provides a compelling normative account that
fits the core content of property as a legal institution. As discussed in greater
detail below, the local knowledge argument explains some of the most basic and
generally applicable features of property, including an owner’s authority to set
the agenda for a resource. 81 While the local knowledge argument is contingent
on empirical premises regarding the challenges associated with accounting for
81. See infra Part II.D.
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local knowledge, these challenges are enduring features of the human experience
in managing physical resources.
The local knowledge justification for property can be summed up as follows:
Property owners tend to have relevant local knowledge about resources. And
property rights, in turn, confer decision-making authority on owners that is
immune in important ways from outside interference. This decision-making
authority puts owners in a position to make decisions that are informed by local
knowledge that is not available to others. To the extent that local knowledge is
relevant to informing decisions about a physical resource, as it often is,
conferring decision-making authority on parties with such knowledge can lead
to better decisions and better outcomes than would otherwise be possible.
B. Knowledge and Consequences
The claim that property rights lead to better decisions by channeling local
knowledge is, ultimately, a consequentialist argument. A decision made by a
party with local knowledge will tend to be “better” than one made by a party
without such knowledge, in the sense that it will bring about consequences that
are superior to the alternatives. According to what metric are the consequences
superior? In principle, arguments can be advanced based on a range of values,
including familiar grounds based on welfare maximization or human flourishing.
Better decisions could mean decisions that bring about consequences more
aligned with satisfying individuals’ subjective preferences, 82 or alternatively,
with some more objective and less relativistic understanding of the conditions
of human flourishing. 83 If local knowledge improves an owner’s ability to
achieve desired ends, then it can in principle allow for better decisions according
to whatever criteria inform the owner’s decision-making, subject to institutional
constraints that limit the permissible conduct of owners.
It is important to acknowledge here that decision-making about resources
involves several components, of which the knowledge held by the decisionmaker is only one––albeit a crucial one. In addition to knowledge, decisions are
also informed by the values and preferences of the decision-maker, as well as
institutional constraints, such as those that serve to limit externalities. The most
prominent consequentialist justifications for property rights tend to focus on
these latter aspects of decision-making, while mostly taking knowledge and
information for granted. On these accounts, property rights internalize the costs
and benefits of activities, which tends to align owners’ incentives with what is
socially optimal. 84 Property rights provide incentives to work, produce,
improve, and avoid the overuse of resources, and thus to bring about desirable
consequences. A party with self-seeking preferences can be led to use a resource
82. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 16, 21, 36 (2006).
83. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, 85−90 (2d ed. 2011).
84. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(1967).

658

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70:637

efficiently through property rights that ensure she can exclude others and keep
the product of her labor. 85
This article has sought to emphasize that the knowledge held by the decisionmaker is crucial to effective decision-making, but that does not mean that these
other components of decision-making can be ignored. The incentives to work,
produce, improve, and avoid the overuse of resources created by exclusive
property rights are important in many contexts. Similarly, laws that limit
externalities, such as the tort of nuisance or land use regulations, can be
appropriate, even if one acknowledges the importance of local knowledge.
These other components of decision-making also have implications for
arguments that seek to justify property rights on the basis of local knowledge.
Specifically, a knowledge-based argument for property must explain how it is
that decisions made according to the diverse values and preferences of particular
owners will ultimately lead to consequences that are viewed as desirable from
the point of view of society as a whole. On its own, the argument that property
channels local knowledge leading to better decision-making is subject to a major
limitation: an owner’s decision will only take account of the owner’s values and
preferences, not those of non-owners. And so, while an owner may be in a
position to make a better-informed decision than anyone else, that decision will
not necessarily be the best one for everyone. For instance, a landowner
committed to conservation might decide to leave land in its natural state, without
taking into account the interests of people who need housing that could be built
on that land. Alternatively, an owner might choose to build a mega-mansion for
herself on the land to use as a second home. In both cases, the owner’s decision
might fail to take account of the needs and interests of other people, even if the
owner’s decision is informed by local knowledge.
There are at least two possible ways to address the problem of ensuring that a
property system is able to harness local knowledge in a way that serves the
interests of a broad range of members of the society. The first approach is to
focus on the distribution of property rights. One could require that the overall
distribution of rights within the property system be such that each person has the
opportunity to reflect her own values and priorities in decisions about resources.
For instance, Jeremy Waldron has argued for property as a “general right,”
meaning that every individual in a society ought to have the opportunity to
pursue her desired ends through the exercise of property rights. 86 This would in
principle allow for each individual to bring his own values and priorities to bear
in making decisions about resources, while at the same time tending to ensure
that those making decisions have access to local knowledge about their
resources. Under such a property system, local knowledge can be effectively
85. See generally Knight, supra note 3; Hardin, supra note 3; POSNER, supra note 3, at 40−41;
Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property?, supra note 4, at 360−66; BLACKSTONE, supra note
4,*3−5; SMITH, supra note 4, at 9−86; Besley & Ghatak, supra note 4, at 4529−34.
86. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 390−422 (1988); see also JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 140−78 (2000).

Fall 2021]

Property and Local Knowledge

659

channeled, while at the same time reflecting the interests of a broad range of
members of society. 87
The other possible response to the challenge of ensuring that the property
system serves a sufficiently broad range of interests is to rely on an appeal to
markets. One might argue that property rights, when combined with markets,
can create the conditions for owners to use their local knowledge in a way that
serves the interests of others, ultimately making both owners and non-owners
better off. That is essentially Hayek’s position. 88 Where markets are in place,
property owners are able to take account of their own local knowledge as well
as the information they receive in the form of price signals about local conditions
elsewhere. This allows for a degree of economic coordination that would be too
information-intensive to be achieved by a centralized authority. 89 One could
argue that the property system is a necessary part of a market economy that
serves the interests of a broad range of parties, including those that do not
themselves have significant property rights in physical resources. And so, for
instance, consumers benefit from the efficient allocation of resources by
landowning farmers, in the form of low prices for food, regardless of whether
those consumers themselves own land. The argument is essentially that the
rising tide of economic growth, fed in part by the local knowledge of property
owners, eventually lifts all boats.
While a justification for property based on local knowledge can rely on an
appeal to markets, the argument can also depend, to at least some degree, on the
distribution of property rights. Owners are able to take advantage of local
knowledge to achieve their ends to a degree that more centralized decisionmakers would not be able to achieve. To the extent that the pursuit of those ends
is justified in light of the values and interests of others in the society, then
property rights can be justified as a useful and sometimes necessary means to
achieving valued ends by uniting local knowledge and decision-making
authority.
The local knowledge justification for property rights is not inconsistent with
other justifications, including those based on economic incentives to work,
produce, improve, improve, and avoid the overuse of resources, as well as those
based on moral rights to property. 90 The justification set out above is in fact
87. The distribution of property interests could also be informed by special moral entitlements
to particular resources. For instance, for reasons of justice one might take the position that the
interests and values of an Indigenous community should be prioritized in decisions about its
traditional territory. For an argument framing Indigenous property interests in terms of moral
rights, see Malcolm Lavoie, Locke, Hegel, and Rights to Property: Examining the Unstable
Ideological Architecture of the Canadian Law of Aboriginal Title, 69 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV.
25.
88. Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8, at 524−26, 529; 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 74−75 (1979).
89. Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8, at 524−26, 529; 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 74−75 (1979).
90. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 3, at 40; WALDRON, supra note 86, at 390−422.
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broadly aligned with these approaches and can draw upon them to address
concerns about the distribution of decision-making authority.
C. Local Knowledge and Ownership Concentration
The capacity of a property system to channel local knowledge depends on the
distribution of property rights in a society. The knowledge function of property
is best served when property rights decentralize decision-making authority over
resources, allocating it to a dispersed pool of owners who are more likely to have
access to relevant local knowledge. When the ownership of resources is highly
concentrated, it becomes less likely that owners will actually have relevant local
knowledge about the resources they control. The absentee owner of a vast swath
of farmland, for instance, is arguably in no better position in terms of local
knowledge than a central planning bureaucracy. This caveat regarding
ownership concentration is broadly consistent with at least some modern
understandings of property. Joseph Singer, for instance, has argued that some
degree of dispersal of ownership is built into what it means to have a system of
private property. 91
As discussed above, there are considerations other than local knowledge, such
as minimizing transaction costs, that may explain the control of resources by
larger organizations. 92 The point at which the benefits of a larger organization
are outweighed by the inability to act effectively on local knowledge is contextdependent and difficult to assess as an empirical matter. The degree of
decentralized control, within a property system as a whole, that is necessary to
best take advantage of local knowledge is also difficult to pinpoint empirically.
However, if one acknowledges that one of the functions of a property system is
to decentralize decision-making about resources, then there is presumably a
point at which ownership concentration would become so great that the property
system would no longer adequately serve that function. 93
The local knowledge justification for property rights thus comes with an
important caveat regarding the distribution of property rights. If ownership is
unduly concentrated, then property rights do not, in fact, result in decentralized
control over resources by parties more likely to have access to local knowledge.
A single owner of a vast territory has fewer opportunities to acquire local
knowledge about the land than would be the case if the land were divided into
many smaller parcels, each with a separate owner.
The claim that property systems are best able to channel local knowledge
when ownership is dispersed within a society aligns with recent empirical work
in development economics that establishes two key propositions: 1) secure
91. SINGER, supra note 86, at 170.
92. See infra Part III.B.
93. The same problem could arise through the concentration of decision-making authority in
the officers of corporations, even if the ownership of the shares of those corporations were broadly
held.
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property rights are important institutional precursors for economic
development, 94 and 2) significant ownership concentration can hinder economic
development. 95
The correlation between secure, formal, private property rights and high levels
of economic development is quite strong. 96 A large body of economic literature
supports the importance of property rights to economic development, though the
causal link is not straightforward. 97 Property rights are arguably a necessary
element of the institutional package that promotes economic development, even

94. See Douglass C. North & Robert Paul Thomas, An Economic Theory of the Growth of the
Western World, 23 ECON. HIST. REV. 1 (1970); Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast,
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in
Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989); Douglass C. North, Institutions and
Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction, 17 WORLD DEV. 1319 (1989); Dani Rodrik et al.,
Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic
Development 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 131 (2004); Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001)
[hereinafter Acemoglu et al., Comparative Development]; Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson,
Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949 (2005) [hereinafter Acemoglu & Johnson,
Unbundling Institutions]; Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of LongRun Growth, in 1A HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 385 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N.
Durlauf eds., 2005); Besley & Ghatak, supra note 4, at 4552-58; HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE
MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE
(2000).
95. See Philippe Aghion et al., Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New
Growth Theories, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1615 (1999); DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A.
ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 428−62
(2012) [hereinafter ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL]; Sheilagh Ogilvie and A.W.
Carus, Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective, in 2A HANDBOOK OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH 403, 444−50 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf, eds., 2014) (arguing that
property rights facilitate growth when they are “generalized”, i.e., open to all agents in the economy
and not just a subset).
96. The list of the top 30 countries in the world as measured by GDP per capita is dominated
by countries with secure regimes of formal property rights, which establishes some level of
correlation, though not necessarily causation. INT’L MONETARY FUND, Report for Selected
Countries and Subjects, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK DATABASE, April 2019,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true
(last
visited 28 Jan. 2020); see also Ceyhun Haydaroğlu, The Relationship Between Property Rights and
Economic Growth: An Analysis of OECD and EU Countries, 6 DANUBE 217 (2015).
97. See North & Thomas, supra note 94; North & Weingast, supra note 94; Rodrik et al.,
supra note 94; North, supra note 94; Acemoglu et al., Comparative Development, supra note 94;
Acemoglu & Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, supra note 94; Besley & Ghatak, supra note 4; DE
SOTO, supra note 94, at 16–17. But see Ha-Joon Chang, Institutions and Economic Development:
Theory, Policy and History, 7 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 473, 494 (2011) (cautioning against
concluding that the strongest possible property rights are always best); ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON,
WHY NATIONS FAIL, supra note 95, at 428−62 (emphasizing the importance of “inclusive” political
institutions, which include but are not limited to a stable property rights regime); Naomi R.
Lamoureaux, The Mystery of Property Rights: A U.S. Perspective, 71 J. ECON. HIST. 275 (2011);
Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for
Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2008).
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if they are seemingly not a sufficient condition for growth. 98 One of the more
recent empirical insights emphasizes the importance of “inclusive” institutions,
including institutions that limit economic inequality, for economic growth. 99
Others have argued that property rights are most likely to promote growth when
they are “generalized,” meaning they are open to all agents in the economy and
not just a narrow subset. 100
Conventional explanations for the inverse relationship between inequality and
growth include: the association between inequality and “extractive” or corrupt
political institutions, limits on access to credit by those without significant
property holdings, and enhanced gains from trade and incentive effects when
ownership rights can be sold to a wider range of parties. 101 However, the
knowledge function of property may also help explain why property rights seem
to work best where ownership concentration is limited. Where ownership is
highly concentrated, property rights are less effective at channeling local
knowledge into decisions about resources. In societies in which the ownership
of resources is highly concentrated, resources are less likely to be owned by a
party with access to relevant local knowledge about them. Parties on the ground,
such as the residents of a shantytown, may still acquire local knowledge, but
they are prevented from effectively acting on it without a formally recognized
property interest. 102 In such cases, the property system denies decision-making
authority to those with access to local knowledge, effectively the inverse of a
knowledge-channeling property system with more broadly distributed property
rights.
Ownership concentration appears to be a particularly important factor for
economic development in the agricultural sector. In the mid-20th century, a
number of countries, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, achieved high
levels of growth in agricultural productivity following land reforms that
significantly reduced the ownership concentration of arable land. 103 These
reforms have also been credited as a cause of the rapid growth and
industrialization of these economies in the latter half of the 20th century.104 The
associated productivity gains are often attributed to the improved incentives
98. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL, supra note 95, at 429−30.
99. Id. at 428−62.
100. Ogilvie & Carus, supra note 95, at 444−50.
101. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL, supra note 95, at 368−403; Sarah
Voitchovsky, Inequality and Economic Growth, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY 549, 559 (Wiemer Salverda, Brian Nolan & Timothy M. Smeeding eds., 2009);
Ogilvie & Carus, supra note 95, at 444−50.
102. See, e.g, DE SOTO, supra note 94, at 15−28.
103. Cristóbal Kay, Why East Asia Overtook Latin America: Agrarian Reform,
Industrialisation and Development, 23 THIRD WORLD Q. 1073, 1077, 1079−84 (2002); YoongDeok Jeon & Young-Yong Kim, Land Reform, Income Redistribution, and Agricultural Production
in Korea, 48 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 253, 264−65 (2000); JOE STUDWELL, HOW ASIA
WORKS: SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN THE WORLD’S MOST DYNAMIC REGION 25−34 (2013).
104. Kay, supra note 103, at 1079−84; STUDWELL, supra note 103.
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agricultural workers face when they are cultivating their own land, and the
difficulties associated with monitoring farmers. 105 However, the enhanced
ability of owner-cultivators to incorporate local knowledge into their decisions,
including decisions to adopt technological innovations, may have also played a
part.
The association between ownership concentration and growth in agriculture
is especially noteworthy. Local knowledge is particularly important in the
agricultural sector, where constantly changing factors specific to a particular
place and time, such as soil conditions and weather, are so significant. 106 It is
therefore particularly difficult for those without first-hand experience of local
conditions to make effective resource-management decisions in this sector. The
fact that ownership concentration seems especially significant to growth in a
sector in which local knowledge is so important invites further investigation.
The function of widely dispersed property rights in channeling local knowledge
into decisions may be under-appreciated as a mechanism for growth by
development economists. This could be a fruitful topic for future empirical
scholarship.
D. Property Institutions and Local Knowledge
In principle, a wide range of property institutions can channel local
knowledge. The local knowledge argument can serve to justify both individual
property rights as well as collective rights in common-pool resources managed
by a defined group of people. An individual owner of a resource is wellpositioned to learn about its localized features, but members of a group
managing a resource can also acquire and act upon such knowledge under the
right circumstances. As long as group membership is limited and internal
processes exist for sharing information and making collective decisions based
on that information, a group ought to be able to channel local knowledge about
a common-pool resource. Indeed, existing literature on common-pool resources
indicates that the management of such resources is most likely to succeed in
cases involving either small groups or larger organizations that include smaller
nested groups. 107 These conditions help to ensure parties can effectively share
information relevant to local conditions and act upon it. 108
The local knowledge argument for property is also consistent with a range of
other doctrinal specifications that may accompany a property interest. For
instance, while the choice to alienate a resource is one important decision that
105. Jeon & Kim, supra note 103, at 260−65.
106. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 318.
107. Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1346−52; ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS
101−02 (Canto Classics ed. 2015); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 177−78 (1991) (explaining the significance of “close-knit groups”
to the development of effective norms, including norms governing a commons) [hereinafter
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW].
108. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 107, at 177–78.
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can be informed by local knowledge, alienability is not essential to the argument.
A property owner without the power to alienate is still able to make other
important decisions about the agenda for a resource that can be informed by local
knowledge. In cases where special considerations may motivate alienation
restraints, such as with respect to Indigenous interests in land, the argument from
local knowledge can still explain and help to justify the core characteristics of
the interest, including the power of owners to make decisions about the use of
the resource.
Similarly, the local knowledge argument for property rights is consistent with
restrictions on the use of a resource, as long as a sufficient degree of residual
control rests with the owner. A residential homeowner may not have the right
to build a multi-story tower on his land, but he can still be empowered to act on
local knowledge in many other significant ways. Indeed, the success of urban
communities may depend in part on institutions’ ability to take account of local
knowledge, even if the density of these communities also means there are more
likely to be spillover effects on neighbors that motivate land use restrictions.
The urban theorist Jane Jacobs emphasized the pitfalls of seeking to impose
development plans through top-down processes that fail to account for the
existing diversity of uses. 109 A thriving neighborhood typically includes a mix
of homes and businesses suited to the needs and lifestyles of the residents,
whereas one of the hallmarks of planned communities in the 20th century was a
sterile separation of uses. 110 Property rights are one of the key mechanisms that
allow locals to act on their knowledge of life in the community in providing for
a diverse set of land uses. There may be good reasons to restrict certain uses.
For instance, a new tower could conceivably disrupt the pattern of life in a
neighborhood in detrimental ways. However, the residual power of owners to
make land-use decisions still plays an important role in channeling local
knowledge. Even if certain uses are restricted, the availability of a meaningful
range of potential land uses allows owners to adapt to local conditions.
Local knowledge arguments can justify property regimes in a number of
different institutional settings in part because the argument is consistent with a
range of complementary normative principles.
However, despite the
adaptability of local knowledge arguments, there is one key requirement that
must be satisfied. A property system must provide a mechanism for recognizing
the decision-making authority of a dispersed pool of owners. If a resource
management regime fails to decentralize decision-making authority in this way,
then it is not likely to be capable of adequately channeling local knowledge into
decisions about resources.

109. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 143−49, 435−39
(1961). See also SCOTT, supra note 11, at 103−46 (contrasting “high-modernist” urban theory,
which emphasized visual order, with Jacobs’ work, which starts from the lived experience of urban
life).
110. JACOBS, supra note 109, at 143−49, 435−39.
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E. Property and Subsidiarity
There is a certain affinity between the local knowledge argument for property
and the principle of “subsidiarity,” which holds that more centralized authorities
should have a subsidiary function, performing tasks that cannot effectively be
performed at a more local level. 111 Originally derived from Catholic social
thought, “subsidiarity” came to be adopted in the 20th century as a principle of
European Union law. 112 The concept has also proven influential in scholarship
relating to federalism, international law, and environmental law. 113 Indeed, the
growing appreciation for the principle of subsidiarity in these fields has meant
that the importance of local decision-making is today more often acknowledged
in discussions of public law than it is with respect to property and private law.
The classical justification for subsidiarity is based on moral agency and
responsibility, as well as access to human goods associated with the exercise of
agency. The basic argument is that centralized authorities should not “absorb”
their constituent local associations and members, but rather leave them space for
meaningful action. 114 People should not be reduced to cogs in a larger machine
because doing so deprives them of agency and the human goods associated with
contributing in a meaningful way to the decisions that affect them. 115 Authority
should rest at the most decentralized level that is effective—which could be a
family, community association, or local government—not necessarily because
these bodies will make “better” decisions, but rather because decentralized
authority more fully respects the humanity of those subject to the decisions. 116
A traditional defense of property based on subsidiarity would thus emphasize
the moral agency of those involved in decision-making, such as individual
families and business owners, rather than the local knowledge they may be able
to draw upon.
A consequentialist argument for property based on the importance of local
knowledge differs in important ways from the classical justification for
subsidiarity. My argument has been that the decentralized decision-making that
property facilitates tends to be “better” than more centralized decision-making,
in terms of the consequences for those affected by it. This argument focuses on
the informational content going into a decision and the resulting effects of the

111. FINNIS, supra note 83, at 144−47.
112. Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35
IND. L. REV. 103, 108−26 (2001).
113. See id. at 127−42; Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of
International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38 (2003); James L. Huffman, Making
Environmental Regulation More Adaptive Through Decentralization: The Case for Subsidiarity,
52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1377 (2004); Dwight Newman, Changing Division of Powers Doctrine and the
Emergent Principle of Subsidiarity, 74 SASK. L. REV. 21 (2011).
114. FINNIS, supra note 83, at 144−47; Vischer, supra note 112, at 108−10.
115. FINNIS, supra note 83, at 144−47.
116. Id.
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decision, rather than the inherent value and human goods associated with
participating meaningfully in a decision.
While the local knowledge argument for property is clearly distinct from
traditional accounts of the subsidiarity principle, these arguments do align in
endorsing decentralized decision-making in the absence of countervailing
justifications. The local knowledge argument can thus readily be adapted as a
supplementary justification for the principle of subsidiarity. On this account,
local decision-making should be preferred not just out of respect for human
agency and the human goods associated with meaningful participation in
decision-making, but also because local decision-makers are more likely to be
able to draw upon valuable local knowledge relevant to the decision.117 Indeed,
this local-knowledge-based reinforcement of the subsidiarity principle is
relevant not just with respect to property, but also in the various public law
domains in which subsidiarity is more commonly invoked. Widely held
property rights, like local government, can be viewed as a manifestation of the
broader principle of subsidiarity, which in turn is justified on overlapping
grounds which include the argument from local knowledge.
III. LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND PROPERTY LAW
The local knowledge function of property rights helps to answer one of the
most basic questions about property rights: why should we have this ubiquitous
institution, as opposed to some other, more centralized approach to resource
management? But in addition to shedding light on the justification for property
rights, the local knowledge function of property law can also help explain a
number of basic doctrinal features of property law regimes. Here I will focus on
three elements: 1) the agenda-setting authority of owners; 2) the role of physical
proximity to a resource under the concepts of possession and accession; and 3)
the role of temporal proximity to a resource under doctrines that limit a past
owner’s power to bind the decision-making authority of current owners.
A. Agenda-Setting Authority
Larissa Katz has persuasively argued that the essential feature of property is
the exclusive right of the owner to set the agenda for a resource. 118 An owner’s
exclusive agenda-setting position includes the authority to make decisions such
as how the resource will be used and by whom. Katz contrasts her account of
the concept of property with the views of “boundary theorists,” who emphasize

117. The connection between subsidiarity and these kinds of local knowledge is occasionally
made in public law. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 113, at 1378−79 (2004); Aurélian Portuese,
The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Principle of Economic Efficiency, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 231,
236−37 (2011).
118. Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity, supra note 37, at 277−78.
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the right to exclude as being the essential feature of the concept of property. 119
Her account also stands in contrast to those that allow for a broader range of
essential features of property rights, such as the right to possess, the right to use,
and the right to income, as well as accounts that hold property to be a purely
conventional “bundle of rights” with no essential features. 120 Katz defends her
approach primarily in terms of its descriptive fit with existing property law
doctrine. Unlike the right to exclude, which sometimes must yield to other
considerations, the right to set the agenda for a resource, at least as against other
private parties, is present in virtually all circumstances in which property as a
concept is invoked. Moreover, other important rights, including the right to
exclude, use, and possess can be understood as subsidiary to the right to set the
agenda for the resource. 121 Each of these subsidiary rights can assist the owner
in her exercise of the over-arching right to set the agenda for the resource.
The local knowledge function of property helps to reinforce the view that
agenda-setting authority is indeed central to the concept of property. The
owner’s authority to set the agenda is the key doctrinal element necessary to
allow owners to channel local knowledge into decisions about their resources.
Property could not serve its knowledge-channeling function if owners were not
empowered to act on their knowledge by making important decisions about their
resources. The agenda-setting authority of owners is thus central and necessary
to the local knowledge function of property. The same could not necessarily be
said for other incidents of property ownership. For instance, an owner without
a right to exclude could still effectively channel local knowledge into decisions
about the resource, as long as other agenda-setting powers were present. Limits
on the right to exclude from a quasi-public space like a shopping mall, for
instance, would not necessarily deprive the owner of the right to set the agenda
for the space by leasing out retail space and building inviting corridors and
attractions, and those decisions could be grounded in local knowledge about the
mall and its potential customers. 122
It must be acknowledged that exclusion and agenda-setting are closely
connected. An owner’s right to exclude implicitly protects an indefinite range
of uses from which an owner can choose. 123 At the same time, it is unlikely that
a property system could effectively maintain owners’ agenda-setting authority
in many settings without the right to exclude, at least as a baseline
119. See Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 71. See also J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY IN LAW 68−104 (1997) (arguing “the right to property should be conceived as the right
of exclusive use”).
120. Honoré, supra note 71; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28−33 (1913); Thomas C. Grey,
The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 69 (1980).
121. Cf. Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 71, at 740−45 (proposing most other attributes
of property may be derived from the right to exclude).
122. See Harrison v. Carswell, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200 (Can.).
123. Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 26, at 1754.
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presumption. 124 Indeed, the right to exclude is often essential to the practical
functioning of property systems. From the point of view of channeling local
knowledge into decisions, however, agenda-setting authority is conceptually
necessary, while exclusion may only be a practical necessity in many cases.
The argument from local knowledge provides a functionalist justification for
property that closely fits the descriptive account of property as exclusive agendasetting authority. In this sense, it may help to complete the agenda-setting
account of property as a legal theory that both fits and justifies property. 125
There are other normative arguments that fit with the agenda-setting account of
property, including an argument from individual autonomy that Katz herself
makes: essentially, the agenda-setting authority of owners helps to create a
sphere of autonomy for them. 126 The account of property as channeling local
knowledge can perhaps serve as a functionalist justificatory complement to
Katz’s rights-based account grounded in individual autonomy.
Indeed, this kind of overlap between rights-based and functionalist accounts
of the law fits with a broader trend in private law theory. One of the hallmarks
of the so-called “new private law” is a growing understanding of the ways in
which functionalist and rights-based accounts of private law converge in
explaining and justifying private law doctrines. 127 To the extent that there is
overlap between an understanding of property based on channeling local
knowledge and an understanding of property informed by individual autonomy
considerations, this would seem to provide further evidence of the moral
pluralism underlying private law doctrine.
It is interesting to note that other consequentialist justifications for property,
such as those based on internalizing costs and benefits, tend to point to the right
to exclude as the essential feature of property. Property creates incentives to
work, produce, improve, and avoid the overuse of resources only to the extent
that other parties can be excluded. Exclusion is necessary to these arguments,
whereas agenda-setting does not seem to be. The incentive to sow today is only
enhanced by property rights if one can exclude others from reaping in the future.
Similarly, property only creates incentives to avoid the overuse of resources if
one can exclude others from using the resource and thus internalize the longterm benefits. Setting the agenda for the resource does not obviously have the
same significance to these arguments.
124. On the cost trade-offs associated with using governance rather than exclusions strategies
to manage resource conflicts, see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies
for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002).
125. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1097−101 (1975)
(discussing the criteria of fit and justification).
126. Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity, supra note 37, at 311−15.
127. John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1640, 1662−63 (2012); Smith, Law of Things, supra note 33, at 1725−26. See also Andrew S.
Gold, Internal and External Perspectives: On Methodology in the New Private Law, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW (Andrew S. Gold et al. eds., 2020).
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The truth may be that property is justified on a number of different,
overlapping grounds, some of which point to exclusion as the essential doctrinal
element and some of which point to agenda-setting. The acknowledgment of
moral pluralism underlying property may mean that the attempt to identify a
single doctrinal feature as the essence of property is misguided. From the
restricted point of view of the argument from local knowledge, however,
exclusive agenda-setting authority is the essential feature.
B. Proximity-Reinforcing Doctrines
1. Possession
The knowledge function of property can also help explain the central role of
the concept of possession in property law. At common law, possession is
presumptive evidence of ownership. 128 Possession also serves to order the
priority of competing claims, with earlier possession taking precedence over
later possession. 129 Perhaps most controversially, under the doctrine of adverse
possession, continuous possession over a given period of time can give rise to a
claim that can defeat the claim of the title holder. 130 Scholars have argued that
possession, including the doctrine of adverse possession, serves a range of
functions that include: 1) incentivizing the productive use of resources, since
parties in possession are more likely to be using resources productively; 131 2)
providing a signal to third parties as to who controls the resource and protecting
third-party expectations that form based on that signal; 132 and 3) helping to
ensure that objects of property have owners setting their agenda. 133
The local knowledge function of property law provides an alternative way of
understanding the significant role of possession in property law. Essentially,
possessors are more likely to have relevant knowledge about the resource than
non-possessors, which means they are presumptively in a better position to make
decisions about the resource than non-possessors. Possessors of a resource have
128. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 72, 82,
90 (3d ed. 2017) (“First possession is used to establish ownership when the thing being claimed is
regarded as unowned—as being up for grabs.”) [hereinafter MERRILL & SMITH, PROPERTY];
BRUCE ZIFF, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 153, 175 (7th ed. 2018) (“Possession or the right to
possession, not ownership or title per se, determines the ability of an owner (or other aggrieved
person) to sue in tort in response to a wrongful interference with chattels.”) [hereinafter ZIFF,
PROPERTY LAW].
129. MERRILL & SMITH, PROPERTY, supra note 128, at 125, 857; ZIFF, PROPERTY LAW, supra
note 128, at 175−77.
130. 16 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 91.01, 3 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender
2005) (1949); MERRILL & SMITH, PROPERTY, supra note 128, at 161; ZIFF, PROPERTY LAW, supra
note 128, at 161−62.
131. POWELL, supra note 130, § 91.0; MERRILL & SMITH, PROPERTY, supra note 128, at 173;
ZIFF, PROPERTY LAW, supra note 128, at 163.
132. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985).
133. Larissa Katz, The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession, 55 MCGILL L.J. 47 (2010).
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physical proximity to the resource and are more likely to be engaged in activities
with it, two of the key indicators of local knowledge. Of course, the superior
knowledge of parties in possession must be balanced against other factors,
including the benefits of certainty of title and facilitating efficient transactions
that come with having a concept of ownership that is distinct from possession.
Nevertheless, the privileged epistemic position of parties in possession provides
a basis for preferring their claims in the absence of evidence of superior title, as
well as possibly for preferring the claim of a long-term possessor over that of an
owner who has completely disengaged from the resource. Parties in possession
have better information, and are likely to make better decisions, and so there
would have to be a good countervailing reason to allow someone else to claim
the resource.
Local knowledge is thus one of the ideas that helps explain the role of
possession in property law. Importantly, the local knowledge function of
possession is not diminished or rendered obsolete in any way by reliance on
written records, unlike some of the other functions of possession. For instance,
the signaling role of possession becomes much less significant when reliable
title records are available, especially when records are guaranteed by public title
registries. When there are reliable title records, third parties, including potential
purchasers or creditors, no longer have to rely on possession as a signal of likely
ownership. Rather, they can simply check the records. The existence of land
title registries is often cited as one of the main arguments for legal reforms that
downgrade the importance of possession, including proposals to abolish adverse
possession. 134 Where registries are in place, reliance interests are arguably
better served by protecting the rights of the registered owner, rather than longterm possessors. Indeed, most Canadian provinces with “Torrens” land title
registries that guarantee registered interests have abolished adverse
possession. 135
The trend in the law of adverse possession in the U.S. has also been towards
greater emphasis on written records rather than actual possession. Some states
now require, as a precondition for an adverse possession claim, that an occupant
have paid property taxes for the relevant time period or have entered into
possession pursuant to a document or deed ostensibly granting title. 136 These
134. ATLA. L. REFORM INST., ADVERSE POSSESSION AND LASTING IMPROVEMENTS TO
WRONG
LAND
10−12
(2020),
https://www.alri.ualberta.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/FR115.pdf.
135. Id. at 35, 107−09.
136. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-200 (2020) (requiring that an occupant be listed in the relevant
county for taxation purposes, hold title under a recorded deed or document, or have inherited the
claim from a predecessor in title in possession of the land); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 325 (Deering
2021) (The provision requires the payment of taxes as a precondition for an adverse possession
claim. It also creates a heightened standard for possession in the case of claims not founded upon
a written instrument, judgment, or decree.) Other states provide for shorter limitations periods
where taxes have been paid or the claimant entered into possession pursuant to a deed or other
document purporting to grant title. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-41-101, 38-41-108 (2020)
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approaches are consistent with the view that the function of possession is
primarily one of signaling. Under these reforms, adverse possession claims are
limited to cases where other signals of ownership, such as deeds or tax records,
are at least ambiguous.
The local knowledge function of possession provides a note of caution with
respect to proposals to diminish the legal significance of possession. Property
interests that are formally or effectively indefeasible, even against the claims of
long-term adverse occupants, allow owners to disengage completely from their
resource for long periods of time, without the risk of being replaced as the owner.
There are, of course, other features of property rights that encourage active
ownership, most notably the positive incentive to derive income and other
benefits from the resource. However, it should be concerning that recent trends
undermine a doctrine that works to ensure that decision-makers are at least
minimally engaged with resources they own. Such reforms make it more likely
that there will be absentee owners lacking relevant local knowledge about
resources they have the formal power to control, while preventing the property
system from conferring legal authority on long-term occupiers who would
presumptively have significant accumulated local knowledge.
2. Accession
The argument from local knowledge can also provide a compelling
explanation for accession, a general principle of property law for allocating
ownership of new resources, including newly discovered resources or newly
salient resources. 137 Under the principle of accession, ownership of a new
resource is assigned to the owner of another resource prominently connected to
the new resource. 138 Accession may be conceptualized either as the acquisition
of a resource by the original owner or, alternatively, as the delineation of the
proper scope of the original owner’s claim as including (or not) the new or newly
salient resource. 139
A recent article by Thomas Merrill argues that the principle of accession can
explain a wide range of property law doctrines. 140 The ownership of newborn
animals is assigned to the owner of the mother. 141 The ownership of crops is
(providing for an 18-year limitation period as the default, but also providing for a seven-year
limitation period in cases where the claimant entered under color of title and paid applicable taxes).
See also 4 TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 1138 (3d ed. 2020); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 7.14 (AM. L. INST. 2000) (providing for presumptive extinguishment of unrecorded
servitudes under recording acts).
137. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 462–
63 (2009) [hereinafter Merrill, Accession].
138. Id. at 463.
139. The acquisition-based view is advanced by Merrill. Id. For the view that accession is
about delineating the scope of ownership, see Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1766−71 (2007).
140. Merrill, Accession, supra note 137, at 463−64.
141. Id. at 464−65.
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assigned to the owner of the land. 142 Under the doctrine of accretion, the owner
of land bounded by water holds the title to land that is created by gradual changes
in the water level or alluvial deposits. 143 Under the doctrine of fixtures, the
owner of land also owns chattels annexed to the land. 144 Similarly, with respect
to attached chattels, the owner of the larger or more valuable chattel generally
holds title to the newly created whole. 145 The owner of land has a claim to
chattels that have been mislaid, buried, or stored on the land, subject to the
interest of the true owner of the chattels. 146 Merrill pushes the concept of
accession beyond these core cases, arguing for instance that the ad coelum rule,
according to which the owner of the surface presumptively holds title to airspace
and subsurface minerals, is also a manifestation of accession. On this way of
thinking, newly discovered minerals or airspace that becomes useful to the
surface owner can be understood as being assigned to the owner of the
surface. 147
There are a number of possible explanations for the principle of accession. It
may lower information costs by providing a salient and intuitive solution to the
question of the ownership of new resources. 148 It is easy for third parties to
understand that the ownership of a foal goes to the owner of the mare, for
example. Accession can also avoid some of the problems associated with other
approaches to assigning ownership of new things, such as the principle of first
possession. For instance, the principle of first possession can give rise to
wasteful “races” to be the first to possess, which is something that the principle
of accession avoids. 149 However, perhaps the most significant benefit of
accession is that it assigns ownership to parties who are likely to be competent
owners. The owner of a resource prominently connected to a new resource is
likely to have access to the new resource, as well as access to capital to improve
it. 150 In many cases, though, the main reason that the owner is particularly likely
to be competent will be the local knowledge she holds by virtue of already
owning a closely connected resource. 151
The owner of a connected resource is likely to have a body of knowledge
relevant to using and managing the resource in that context. The owner of a
farm is likely to know what to do with the crops growing on it. If the farm is
bounded by a river, the owner is likely to know how to put new land created by
alluvial deposits to good use. The owner of a boat hull is likely to know what to
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 465.
Id. at 465−66.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 476−79.
Id. at 482−83.
Id. at 489.
Id.
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do with the finished yacht built from the hull. 152 The owner of land is likely to
know how to use and manage a house built on the land, including the associated
fixtures. The owner of the surface of the land is likely to know how to use the
airspace above the land up to a reasonable height, typically for building up from
the surface. Incidentally, it should be acknowledged that the owner of the
surface may know very little about mining for the minerals below. The local
knowledge explanation for accession in the case of minerals does not seem to
hold. This may help explain why in many jurisdictions outside of the United
States the ownership of minerals is presumptively held by the state and not the
surface owner. 153
Local knowledge is not the only possible justification for the principle of
accession. However, in many contexts involving physical resources, it is
arguably the most compelling one. Merrill has argued that the principle of
accession is “ubiquitous” in the law of property. 154 Its ubiquity may in part
reflect the importance of the local knowledge held by owners to a wellfunctioning property system.
C. Temporal Proximity: Future Interests, Alienation Restraints, and the
Numerus Clausus Principle
A range of doctrines work to limit the control of resources by past owners.
These include the rule against perpetuities, the rule against unreasonable
restraints on alienation, and the so-called numerus clausus principle. The rule
against perpetuities limits the time period within which a contingent future
interest must vest, if it is going to vest at all. 155 The rule against unreasonable
restraints on alienation restricts the ability of an owner to impose legally binding
restrictions on the future transfer of a property interest, either directly or
indirectly. 156 Finally, the numerus clausus principle limits the recognition of
property interests that do not fit within existing categories of interests, including
interests subject to unique restrictions on the power of the owner. 157 Each of
these doctrines limits the ability of an owner to place restrictions on a property
152. See McKeown v Cavalier Yachts Proprietary Ltd, (1988) 13 NSWLR 303 (Austl.).
153. Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 971, 977
(2013). There are also other possible explanations, including the fact that the optimal scale for
extracting minerals seldom overlaps with the optimal scale for surface activities like farming or
housing. See Lee Ann Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35, 38−39 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
154. Merrill, Accession, supra note 137, at 464.
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27.1
(AM. L. INST. 2011); CHARLES HARPUM ET AL., THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 320−324 (8th ed.
2012).
156. MERRILL & SMITH, PROPERTY, supra note 128, at 858; POWELL, supra note 130, §§
72.01,77.01; ZIFF, PROPERTY LAW, supra note 128, at 303−05.
157. See Keppell v. Bailey (1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049; 2 My. & K 517, 535−36; ZIFF,
PROPERTY LAW, supra note 128, at 66−67; Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note
33, at 12−14.
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interest that would bind a future owner, including restrictions based on the use
of the resource or who can come to hold it. These doctrines have been
recognized as serving a number of purposes, including: limiting complexity and
lowering the information costs that would otherwise be associated with novel
property interests; 158 protecting the autonomy interest of current owners, as
against past owners; 159 avoiding the excessive decomposition of property
interests into “anticommons” property; 160 and reflecting fundamental values
about how social relationships should be structured. 161
However, each of these doctrines also serves a related purpose of ensuring
temporal proximity between decision-makers and the resources they control.
This in turn makes it more likely that a decision about a resource will be made
by a party with local knowledge that is current. The currency of local knowledge
can be quite important because circumstances change and newer information is
constantly being acquired by parties close to a resource. 162 What may have
seemed an appropriate restriction or condition to place on a resource in the past
may no longer be so, and current owners are in the best position to assess
information about changed circumstances.
For instance, an owner can make an interest contingent on a condition
regarding the use of the resource or the identity of the owner, which can be a
potent tool for controlling future activities. However, under the rule against
perpetuities, the condition cannot remain indefinitely. It must be clear within
the lifespan of a living person plus 21 years whether or not the condition has
been satisfied. 163 The result is that, regardless of the content of the condition,
eventually a future owner will hold the property interest unconditionally. The
rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation and the numerus clausus
principle also limit the ability of an owner to place restrictions on the use or
transfer of a resource that will run with the property interest (as opposed to
merely binding a particular successor in title with whom the transferor has
privity of contract). The effect is to reinforce the agenda-setting control of the
current owner, 164 who has closer temporal proximity to the resource and is thus
in a better position to make decisions based on current knowledge of the
resource.

158. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 33, at 24−42.
159. ZIFF, PROPERTY LAW, supra note 128, at 304; MERRILL & SMITH, PROPERTY, supra note
128, at 858.
160. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 664−65 (1998).
161. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1049−51 (2009); Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and
Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1636−55 (2008).
162. Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8, at 524.
163. ZIFF, PROPERTY LAW, supra note 128, at 310.
164. Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity, supra note 37, at 305−06.
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It is still possible for an owner to bind future owners through easements or
covenants running with the land. But these tools come with important
restrictions on content that serve to preserve the agenda-setting control of the
current owner, who presumptively has the best access to current, local
knowledge about the resource. 165 Moreover, all of these interests are subject to
modification or termination by a court, on the application of the current owner,
where relevant conditions have changed. 166 This provides an avenue to ensure
that an owner’s full authority can ultimately be restored if the covenant or
easement no longer serves its purpose, though admittedly the judge may not be
as well-positioned as the owner to assess the change in circumstances.
And so, while the law does permit certain kinds of ongoing restrictions on the
power of ownership, these are policed both as to content and as to duration, in a
manner that shows a strong preference for the authority of the current owner,
who presumptively has the best access to current local knowledge. It is possible
that recent trends towards the relaxation or abolition of restrictions on past owner
control, including the rule against perpetuities, may be justified on other
grounds. 167 However, the local knowledge argument may provide a reason to
believe that these doctrines do continue to serve an important function.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have argued here that one of the most basic functions of a property regime
is to channel local knowledge of resources into decision-making about them.
Property rights unite local knowledge about a resource and decision-making
authority over that resource in the same party. If this understanding of the
function of property is correct, then it has significant implications. The local
knowledge argument provides an important and largely overlooked justification
for property rights, at least in certain institutional settings. This justification is
potentially contingent on the distribution of resources in a society since the
knowledge function of property is impaired when ownership is highly
concentrated. The local knowledge function of property also helps us
understand the concept of property, along with some of the basic rules of
property law. On this understanding of property, the agenda-setting authority of
owners is of central significance. Moreover, the range of property doctrines that
165. For instance, in Commonwealth countries, positive covenants generally cannot run with
the land. See Rhone v. Stephens, (1994) 2 All Eng. Rep. 65; Durham Condominium Corp. No. 123
v. Amberwood Investments Ltd., (2002) 58 O.R. 3d 481 (Can. Ont. C.A.). In the United States,
positive covenants are typically allowed to run with the land, but they may be removed if the
obligation becomes excessive. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.12. See also
ZIFF, PROPERTY LAW, supra note 128, at 420−25, 469; POWELL, supra note 130, §§ 34.02, 60.06.
166. POWELL, supra note 130, §§ 60.09, 60.10; ZIFF, PROPERTY LAW, supra note 128, at
479−80.
167. On the trend toward abolition of the rule against perpetuities, see Grayson M.P. McCouch,
Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1291 (2013); Max M. Schanzenbach
& Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2465 (2006).
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privilege the rights of those who are close to the resource, physically and
temporally, seem to follow from property’s role in channeling local knowledge.
Channeling local knowledge is not the only function that successful property
systems must fulfill, but it is an important one. It is also one of the functions of
property most consistently neglected by property scholars. To some extent, this
neglect is understandable, given that issues related to fine-tuning existing legal
institutions tend to be more salient than basic functions we may tend to take for
granted. 168 However, a complete understanding of property as an institution
requires an appreciation for the knowledge function served by devolving
authority over resources to particular owners. I hope this article contributes to a
fuller understanding of that function.

168. Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property?, supra note 4, at 398.

